英文原文：
I．Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property，Issued by the U.S. DoJ and the FTC
II. Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, Issued by the FTC and the U.S. DoJ in April 2000
III. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws
IV. Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels [C(98)35/Final]
V. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Issued by the U.S. DoJ and the FTC in April 1995
I.
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
Issued by the U.S. DOJ and the FTC
April 6, 1995
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Intellectual property protection and the antitrust laws
2. General principles
2.1 Standard antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property
2.2 Intellectual property and market power
2.3 Procompetitive benefits of licensing
3. Antitrust concerns and modes of analysis
3.1 Nature of the concerns
3.2 Markets affected by licensing arrangements
3.2.1 Goods markets
3.2.2 Technology markets
3.2.3 Reseach and development: Innovation markets
3.3 Horizontal and vertical relationships
3.4 Framework for evaluating licensing restraints
4. General principles concerning the Agencies’ evaluation of licensing arrangements
4.1 Analysis of anticompetitive effects
4.1.1 Market structure, coordination, and foreclosure
4.1.2 Licensing arrangements involving exclusivity
4.2 Efficiencies and justifications
4.3 Antitrust "safety zone"
5. Application of general principles
5.1 Horizontal restraints
5.2 Resale price maintenance
5.3 Tying arrangements
5.4 Exclusive dealing
5.5 Cross-licensing and pooling arrangements
5.6 Grantbacks
5.7 Acquisition of intellectual property rights
6. Enforcement of invalid intellectual property rights
1. Intellectual property protection and the antitrust laws
1.0 These Guidelines state the antitrust enforcement policy of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (individually, "the Agency," and collectively, "the Agencies") with respect to the licensing of intellectual property protected by patent, copyright, and trade secret law, and of know-how. By stating their general policy, the Agencies hope to assist those who need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a practice as anticompetitive. However, these Guidelines cannot remove judgment and discretion in antitrust law enforcement. Moreover, the standards set forth in these Guidelines must be applied in unforeseeable circumstances. Each case will be evaluated in light of its own facts, and these Guidelines will be applied reasonably and flexibly.
In the United States, patents confer rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling in the United States the invention claimed by the patent for a period of seventeen years from the date of issue. To gain patent protection, an invention (which may be a product, process, machine, or composition of matter) must be novel, nonobvious, and useful. Copyright protection applies to original works of authorship embodied in a tangible medium of expression. A copyright protects only the expression, not the underlying ideas. Unlike a patent, which protects an invention not only from copying but also from independent creation, a copyright does not preclude others from independently creating similar expression. Trade secret protection applies to information whose economic value depends on its not being generally known. Trade secret protection is conditioned upon efforts to maintain secrecy and has no fixed term. As with copyright protection, trade secret protection does not preclude independent creation by others.
The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and original works of expression. In the absence of intellectual property rights, imitators could more rapidly exploit the efforts of innovators and investors without compensation. Rapid imitation would reduce the commercial value of innovation and erode incentives to invest, ultimately to the detriment of consumers. The antitrust laws promote innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.
2. General principles
2.0 These Guidelines embody three general principles:
for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other form of property; the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context; and the Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally procompetitive.
2.1 Standard antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property
……Intellectual property law bestows on the owners of intellectual property certain rights to exclude others. These rights help the owners to profit from the use of their property. An intellectual property owner’s rights to exclude are similar to the rights enjoyed by owners of other forms of private property. As with other forms of private property, certain types of conduct with respect to intellectual property may have anticompetitive effects against which the antitrust laws can and do protect. Intellectual property is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them.
The Agencies recognize that the licensing of intellectual property is often international. The principles of antitrust analysis described in these Guidelines apply equally to domestic and international licensing arrangements. However, as described in the 1995 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, considerations particular to international operations, such as jurisdiction and comity, may affect enforcement decisions when the arrangement is in an international context.
2.2 Intellectual property and market power
Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant period of time. The Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. Although the intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific product, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power. If a patent or other form of intellectual property does confer market power, that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws. As with any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain significant supracompetitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is solely "a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" does not violate the antitrust laws. Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that property to others. As in other antitrust contexts, however, market power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such property.
3. Antitrust concerns and modes of analysis
3.1 Nature of the concerns
While intellectual property licensing arrangements are typically welfare-enhancing and procompetitive, antitrust concerns may nonetheless arise. For example, a licensing arrangement could include restraints that adversely affect competition in goods markets by dividing the markets among firms that would have competed using different technologies. See, e.g., Example 7. An arrangement that effectively merges the research and development activities of two of only a few entities that could plausibly engage in research and development in the relevant field might harm competition for development of new goods and services. See section 3.2.3. An acquisition of intellectual property may lessen competition in a relevant antitrust market. See section 5.7. The Agencies will focus on the actual effects of an arrangement, not on its formal terms…..
3.2 Markets affected by licensing arrangements
Licensing arrangements raise concerns under the antitrust laws if they are likely to affect adversely the prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods and services either currently or potentially available. The competitive effects of licensing arrangements often can be adequately assessed within the relevant markets for the goods affected by the arrangements. In such instances, the Agencies will delineate and analyze only goods markets. In other cases, however, the analysis may require the delineation of markets for technology or markets for research and development (innovation markets) ….
3.3 Horizontal and vertical relationships
As with other property transfers, antitrust analysis of intellectual property licensing arrangements examines whether the relationship among the parties to the arrangement is primarily horizontal or vertical in nature, or whether it has substantial aspects of both…
The existence of a horizontal relationship between a licensor and its licensees does not, in itself, indicate that the arrangement is anticompetitive. Identification of such relationships is merely an aid in determining whether there may be anticompetitive effects arising from a licensing arrangement. Such a relationship need not give rise to an anticompetitive effect, nor does a purely vertical relationship assure that there are no anticompetitive effects…..
3.4 Framework for evaluating licensing restraints
In the vast majority of cases, restraints in intellectual property licensing arrangements are evaluated under the rule of reason. The Agencies’ general approach in analyzing a licensing restraint under the rule of reason is to inquire whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects. See Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); 7 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1502 (1986). See also part 4.
In some cases, however, the courts conclude that a restraint’s "nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive" that it should be treated as unlawful per se, without an elaborate inquiry into the restraint’s likely competitive effect. Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Among the restraints that have been held per se unlawful are naked price-fixing, output restraints, and market division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group boycotts and resale price maintenance.
To determine whether a particular restraint in a licensing arrangement is given per se or rule of reason treatment, the Agencies will assess whether the restraint in question can be expected to contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity. ….
4. General principles concerning the Agencies’ evaluation of licensing arrangements under the rule of reason
4.1 Analysis of anticompetitive effects
The existence of anticompetitive effects resulting from a restraint in a licensing arrangement will be evaluated on the basis of the analysis described in this section.
4.1.1 Market structure, coordination, and foreclosure
When a licensing arrangement affects parties in a horizontal relationship, a restraint in that arrangement may increase the risk of coordinated pricing, output restrictions, or the acquisition or maintenance of market power. Harm to competition also may occur if the arrangement poses a significant risk of retarding or restricting the development of new or improved goods or processes. The potential for competitive harm depends in part on the degree of concentration in, the difficulty of entry into, and the responsiveness of supply and demand to changes in price in the relevant markets. Cf. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 1.5, 3.
….
4.3 Antitrust "safety zone"
Because licensing arrangements often promote innovation and enhance competition, the Agencies believe that an antitrust "safety zone" is useful in order to provide some degree of certainty and thus to encourage such activity. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint. This "safety zone" does not apply to those transfers of intellectual property rights to which a merger analysis is applied. See section 5.7.
….
5. Application of general principles
5.0 This section illustrates the application of the general principles discussed above to particular licensing restraints and to arrangements that involve the cross-licensing, pooling, or acquisition of intellectual property. The restraints and arrangements identified are typical of those that are likely to receive antitrust scrutiny; however, they are not intended as an exhaustive list of practices that could raise competitive concerns.
5.1 Horizontal restraints
…….
Following the general principles outlined in section 3.4, horizontal restraints often will be evaluated under the rule of reason. In some circumstances, however, that analysis may be truncated; additionally, some restraints may merit per se treatment, including price fixing, allocation of markets or customers, agreements to reduce output, and certain group boycotts.
…..
5.7 Acquisition of intellectual property rights
Certain transfers of intellectual property rights are most appropriately analyzed by applying the principles and standards used to analyze mergers, particularly those in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The Agencies will apply a merger analysis to an outright sale by an intellectual property owner of all of its rights to that intellectual property and to a transaction in which a person obtains through grant, sale, or other transfer an exclusive license for intellectual property (i.e., a license that precludes all other persons, including the licensor, from using the licensed intellectual property). Such transactions may be assessed under section 7 of the Clayton Act, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
II. ……
III. ……
IV. ……
V. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Issued by the U.S. DoJ and the FTC in April 1995
一、《與知識產權許可有關的反托拉斯指南》，美國司法部與聯邦貿易委員會1995年4月6日頒布
二、《競爭者合謀反托拉斯指南》，美國司法部與聯邦貿易委員會2000年4月頒布
三、《美國政府與歐共體關于在執行競爭法中適用積極禮讓原則的協議》
四、《經合組織理事會有關反"核心卡特爾"有效行動的建議》[理事會(98)35/最終文件]
五、《國際經營反托拉斯執法指南》，美國司法部與聯邦貿易委員會1995年4月頒布
一、
《與知識產權許可有關的反托拉斯指南》
美國司法部與聯邦貿易委員會聯合頒布
1995年4月6日
目錄
1、知識產權保護與反托拉斯法
2、一般原則
2.1 適用于知識產權的標準反托拉斯分析
2.2 知識產權和市場力量
2.3 許可的競爭好處
3、反托拉斯問題與分析模式
3.1 問題的本質
3.2 受許可影響的市場
3.2.1 貨物市場
3.2.2 技術市場
3.2.3 研究與開發: 創新市場
3.3 水平與垂直關系
3.4 許可限制的評估框架
4、主管機關評估許可安排的一般原則
4.1 反競爭效果分析
4.1.1 市場結構、協調與預先禁止安排
4.1.2 涉及排他性的許可安排
4.2 效益與理由
4.3 反托拉斯"安全區"
5、一般原則的適用
5.1 水平限制
5.2 維持零售價格
5.3 搭售安排
5.4 排他交易
5.5 交叉許可與集體安排
5.6 回授
5.7 購買知識產權
6、無效知識產權的執行
1. 知識產權保護與反托拉斯法
1.0 本《指南》說明美國司法部和美國聯邦貿易委員會（單獨或統稱為"主管機關"）有關知識產權和專有技術許可方面的反托拉斯執法政策，涉及的這些知識產權受專利、版權和商業秘密法保護。通過對其一般政策進行說明，主管機關希望對需要的人提供幫助，使其初步預測主管機關認定某種做法是否具有反競爭性。但是，本《指南》并不排除反托拉斯執法過程中需要具體進行判決和裁決。另外，本《指南》中規定的各項標準，必須適用于各種不可預見的情況。不同的情況需根據具體事實進行評估，要合理、靈活地使用本《指南》。
在美國，專利授予的權利從專利頒發之日起17年內，排除他人在美國制造、使用、或銷售專利包括的發明。為了獲得專利保護，有關發明（可以是產品、工藝、機器或物質成分）必須具有新穎性、有獨創性、有用性。著作權（版權）保護適用于以有形媒體表示的原創著作權作品。著作權（版權）只保護具體的表達方式，并不保護有關的內在思想。與專利不同，專利不僅保護發明不受復制，而且保護不得進行獨立的創造；而著作權（版權）則不排除他人獨立地創造類似的表現形式。商業秘密保護的信息經濟價值，起決于其不為公眾所知。商業秘密保護的前提條件是對保護秘密所做的各種努力，保護不受具體時間限制。與著作權（版權）保護一樣，商業秘密保護不排除他人獨立地進行創造。
知識產權法與反托拉斯法的共同目的是促進創新，并增強消費者的福利。通過為新型、有用產品，更有效的工藝和原創表達作品的創造者建立可執行的產權，知識產權法為有關創新和傳播及商業化提供激勵。如果沒有知識產權，模仿者就可以更快地利用創新者和投資者的成果，而不付出任何報酬。快速的模仿將減少創新的商業價值，并侵蝕投資的積極性，從而最終給消費者帶來損害。反托拉斯法通過禁止某些行動來促進創新、提高消費者福利，被禁止的這些行為可能會在現有或新式客戶服務方面損害競爭。
2. 一般原則
2.0 本《指南》體現以下三個一般原則：
1）在反托拉斯分析方面，主管機關將知識產權基本上看成是與任何其他形式的財產具有可比性；主管機關假設知識產權在反托拉斯背景下并不形成市場力量；且主管機關認為，知識產權許可使公司可以結合各種互補生產要素，總體上傾向促進競爭。
2.1 有形、無形財產知識產權標準反托拉斯分析
……知識產權法對知識產權的所有者授予某些權利，排除他人進行使用。這些權利有助于權利所有者充分利用其產權。知識產權所有者排除他人使用的權利類似，于其他形式私人財產所有者享有的權利。同其他形式的私人財產一樣，有關知識產權某些類型的行為可能具有反托拉斯法可能并實際阻止的反競爭效果。所以，知識產權既不完全脫離反托拉斯法的管制，又不受反托拉斯法的特別監督。
主管機關承認，知識產權許可通常具有國際性。本《指南》中描述的有關反托拉斯分析原則，同樣適用于國內和國際許可安排。但是，正如《1995司法部和聯邦貿易委員會國際經營反托拉斯執法指南》中所描述的，有關國際經營的特別考慮，如管轄權和禮讓等，在國際背景下，可能影響執法決定。
2.2 知識產權和市場力量
市場力量是一種能力，可以在相當長的時期內將價格維持在競爭水平之上、將產量維持在競爭水平之下，從而獲得利潤。主管機關假設專利、著作權（版權）或商業秘密并不必然對所有者行成一種市場力量。雖然知識產權授權在特定產品、工藝或有關作品方面具有排他性，這些產品、工藝或有關作品通常存在充分現實或潛在的相關替代品，以阻止市場力量的發揮。如果專利或其他形式的知識產權授予一種市場力量,該市場力量本身并不違反反托拉斯法。同任何其他有形或無形資產一樣，或許能夠使所有者獲得大量的超級競爭利潤，但僅"由于優越的市場、業務敏感性或歷史事件"構成的市場力量（甚至壟斷）并不違反反托拉斯法。該市場力量也不對知識產權所有者施加一種必須許可他人使用該財產的責任。但是，正如在其他反托拉斯背景一樣，市場力量可能是非法獲得或維持的，或者即使是合法獲得和維持的，也可能與知識產權所有者不合法利用其能力有關，通過與該財產有關的不合理行為，損害競爭。
3. 反托拉斯問題與分析模式
3.1 問題的本質
知識產權許可安排通常具有增加福利、提高競爭的效果，但反托拉斯問題還是會在某些情況下出現。例如,一項許可安排可能包括各種限制，通過在使用不同技術相互競爭的公司之間進行貨物市場劃分，對競爭造成負面影響。參見案例7。一項安排如果有效地將幾個在相關領域從事開發與研究的實體中兩家的研究與開發活動合并在一起，則有可能損害新貨物與服務開發方面的競爭。參見第3.2.3節有關說明。購買知識產權可以減少相關反托拉斯市場中的競爭。參見第5.7節。主管機關主要關注安排的實際效果，而不是其形式上的具體條款。
3.2 受許可影響的市場
如果許可安排可能對當前或潛在可提供的貨物或服務的價格、數量、質量或品種造成負面影響，則該許可安排也可能引起有關反托拉斯法問題。許可安排的競爭效果，通常可以在受該安排影響的有關貨物市場中進行充分的評估。此時，主管機關將只研究和分析貨物市場。但是，在其他有些情況下，分析可能要求對技術市場或研究與開發市場(創新市場)進行細分。……
3.3 水平與垂直關系
同其他財產轉讓一樣，知識產權許可安排的反托拉斯分析要審查安排各方之間的關系本質上主要是水平性質的、還是垂直性質的，或很大程度上具有雙重性。……
許可人與被許可人之間水平關系的存在本身并不表明一項安排具有反競爭性。辨別這種關系的存在僅僅使幫助確定一項許可安排是否會發生反競爭效果。該關系并不必然引起反競爭效果，垂直關系本身也不表明具有任何反競爭效果。
3.4 許可限制的評估框架
在絕大多數情況下，知識產權許可安排中的各種限制要根據合理規則進行評估。主管機關根據合理規則對許可限制進行分析的一般方法，是考察該限制是否具有反競爭效果，如果有反競爭效果，則考察該限制是否是使積極競爭效果超過反競爭效果所合理需要。
但是在有些情況下，法院判決認為，限制的"性質和必然效果如此明顯的具有反競爭性"，所以本身應該判定為非法，不需要更進一步研究限制可能產生的競爭影響。聯邦貿易委員會訴最高法院審判律師協會案（493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990)）；美國全國專業工程師學會訴美國案（435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)）。判定為本身違法的限制情況有：水平競爭對手之間的公開固定價格、產量限制和市場劃分，以及某些集體抵制和維持零售價格等。
為了確定許可安排中的特定限制是否適用本身違法或合理規則，主管機關將評估有關限制是否預期促進經濟活動的增效一體化。……
4. 主管機關根據合理規則評估許可安排的一般原則
4.1 反競爭效果分析
許可安排中的限制造成的反競爭效果的存在，將根據本節說明的分析方法進行評估。
4.1.1 市場結構、協調與預先禁止安排
如果一項許可安排影響水平關系中的各方，則該安排中的限制就可能增加協調定價、產量限制、購買或維持市場力量的風險。如果一項安排對開發新型或改進型貨物或工藝存在重大的推延或限制風險，對競爭的損害也可能會出現。潛在的競爭損害部分起決于相關市場的集中度、進入困難以及供求對價格變動的反應等。參見《1992年水平兼并指南》第1.5節和第3節。
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4.3 反托拉斯"安全區"
由于許可安排通常促進創新并增強競爭，主管機關認為效益與理由是有用的，可以提供某種程度的確定性，并對該活動予以鼓勵。在非異常情況下，主管機關對于下列情形中知識產權許可安排存在的限制將不會有什么異議：（1）該限制表面并不具有反競爭性，（2）許可人及其被許可人一起在受限制影響的各相關市場中所占比重不足20%。"這種安全區"并不適用于尖兵分析所適用的有關知識產權權利轉讓問題。
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5. 一般原則的適用
5.0 本節說明將上述一般原則如何應用于涉及知識產權交叉許可、集體管理和購買的特定許可限制和安排。識別出的這些產權許可限制和安排是可能受到反托拉斯法審查的范例，但是，并不是能引起競爭問題的所有做法方面的清單。
5.1 水平限制
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根據第3.4節說明的一般原則，水平限制通常要根據合理規則進行評估。但是在某些情況下，分析可能會誤入歧途；另外，有些限制可能適用本身違法規則，具體包括固定價格、分配市場或客戶、協議減少產量以及某些集團抵制等。
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5.7 購買知識產權
某些類型的知識產權權利轉讓可以通過分析兼并的原則和標準進行適當的分析，尤其是《1992年水平兼并指南》中的各項原則和標準。主管機關將使用兼并的分析方法，來分析知識產權所有者直接出售其對該知識產權享有的所有權利，并用來分析一個人通過贈與、銷售或其他轉讓獲得有關知識產權排它許可（如排除所有其他人，包括許可人，使用許可知識產權的許可）的交易。該交易可以根據《克萊頓法》第7條和《謝爾曼法》第1條和第2條以及《聯邦貿易委員會法》第5條來進行評估。……
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五、《國際經營反托拉斯執法指南》，美國司法部與聯邦貿易委員會1995年4月頒布
目錄
1 簡介
2 各機關實施的不同反托拉斯法
2.1 《謝爾曼法》
2.2 《克萊頓法》
2.3 《聯邦貿易委員會法》
2.4 《1976年哈特-司各特-羅迪諾反托拉斯改進法》
2.5 《全國合作研究與生產法》
2.6 《韋布-波米琳法案》
2.7 《1982年出口貿易公司法》
2.8 其他相關立法
2.8.1 《威爾遜關稅法》
2.8.2 《1916年反傾銷法》
2.8.3 《1930年關稅法》
2.8.3.1 反補貼關稅
2.8.3.2 反傾銷關稅
2.8.3.3 第337節
2.8.4 《1974年貿易法》
2.8.4.1 第201節
2.8.4.2 第301節
2.9 相關國際協議
2.9.1 雙邊合作協議
2.9.2 國際指南與建議
3 國際執法門檻問題
3.1 管轄權
3.1.1 進口商業行為管轄權
范例一
3.1.2 其他外國商業行為管轄權
3.1.2.1 《1982年對外貿易反托拉斯改進法》第1（一）小節項下案例有關的管轄權
范例二
范例 三
3.1.2.2 《1982年對外貿易反托拉斯改進法》第1（二）小節項下案例有關的管轄權
范例四
范例五
3.1.3 與美國政府融資或購買有關的管轄權
范例六
范例七
3.1.4 《克萊頓法》第7節項下的管轄權
范例八
3.2 禮讓
范例九
范例十
3.3 外國政府參與的效果
3.3.1 外國主權豁免
3.3.2 外國主權強制
范例十一
3.3.3 國家行為
3.3.4 主權請求
范例十二
3.4 反托拉斯執法與國際貿易管制
范例十三
范例十四
4 對人管轄權與程序規則
4.1 對人管轄權與審判地
4.2 與外國有關的調查做法
4.2.2 《哈特-司各特-羅迪諾法》：特殊外國商業規則 |
